

Strategic Issues for NATO Today

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* Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

Founding Principles of NATO

- Purpose of NATO
 - Washington Treaty April 1949
 - Continuous self-help & mutual aid to develop capacity to resist attack
 - Consultation when required or requested
 - Armed attack against one or more is an attack against all
- Normative origins
 - Safeguard the freedom, common heritage, civilization, and security of all members – by political and military means
 - Remain source of stability in an unpredictable world
 - Serve as unique community of values – committed to principles of democracy, individual liberty, human rights, and rule of law
- Originally 12 members
- Headquarters:
 - Paris (until 1967)
 - Today: Brussels




NATO 1990-2014

- Emphasis since end of Cold War:
 - Enlargement—12 new members since 1999
 - Partnerships
 - Out of area missions—Balkans, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya
 - *Not* collective defense or Article 5
- Assumptions during this period
 - No threat from within Europe
 - Light expeditionary forces enough
 - Opportunity to cut and save
- Global Alliance with wide array of concerns and responsibilities
 - Trying to avoid the “Swiss army knife syndrome”



NATO Today

- Core tasks today (2010 Strategic Concept)
 - Collective defense
 - Cooperative Security
 - Crisis management
- NATO serves as strategic and military hub for power projection
 - Strategic and regional stabilizer
- 28 member states
- 41 partner states
 - Partnership for Peace
 - Mediterranean Dialogue
 - Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
 - Global Partners



Strategic Considerations

- Challenge of balancing three core tasks, especially after Ukraine crisis
 - Collective defense
 - Crisis management
 - Cooperative security
- Accommodating different threat perceptions between member states
- Determining appropriate mix of weapons (conv, nuc, MD) to accomplish all three tasks—especially collective defense
- Preparing for different types of conflict:
 - Wars of necessity (e.g. Article 5)
 - Wars of choice
- Defining better burden-sharing relationships
- Determining agreed way to deal with Russia
- Dealing with US “pivot” away from Europe




Wales Summit –September 2014

- No desire to return to a cold war
- No desire to appear provocative to Russia
- The longest communique in NATO history barely mentions deterrence
- Several new initiatives regarding Russia and nonlinear warfare—mostly for conventional forces:
 - Readiness Action Plan (RAP) using the Connected Forces Initiative
 - Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) within NATO Response Force (NRF)
 - Increased readiness and capabilities at HQ Multinational Corps Northeast (Poland)
 - Framework Nations Concept
 - Support to Ukraine through Distinctive Partnership
 - Partnership Interoperability Program
 - Defense and Related Security Capacity Building initiative
 - Bolster cyber security
 - Increased and enhanced exercises
 - Rotational basing in NE Europe



Divided NATO

- Despite summit initiatives, in 2014 most NATO members lacked any sense of urgency to counter Russian moves in the East
 - Much less NATO conventional capability in Europe than in past
 - Most NATO members feel no need to increase defense spending
 - Little interest in nuclear deterrence
 - Potential effect on Alliance solidarity?



Selected Issues



Dealing with Russia

- Aggressive foreign policy
- Aggressive military actions
 - Georgia
 - Crimea
 - Eastern Ukraine
- New military doctrine Dec 2014
 - Nationalist calls for military strength
 - NATO “a source of danger”
- Hybrid warfare
 - Including nuclear “saber rattling”
- NATO responses
 - Wales Summit Declaration
 - Force build-up in northeastern Europe
 - More exercises
 - Support to Ukraine



NATO Nuclear Policy

- “Political weapons”
 - Purpose: deter aggression against Alliance
 - Ultimate security insurance policy
- Three nuclear weapons member states: US, UK, FR
- Nuclear Planning Group and High Level Group meet at 27 (all but France)
- 2012 DDPR: status quo is NATO’s preferred option
- Reduced reliance on nuclear forces
 - Steady and significant reductions in number of systems, number of warheads, and readiness levels since end of Cold War
 - No peacetime contingency plans
 - No adversary, so no pre-designated targets
 - “The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.”
- In 2015, however, no further talk of reductions or arms control negotiations



Future of Deterrence

- Nuclear and Conventional deterrence of attack in Europe since 1949
- Deterrence requirements are changing
 - Impact of Ukrainian crisis
 - Impact of hybrid warfare
 - Role of Alliance in defending Partners
 - Importance of reassuring New Members
- Major decisions regarding NSNW future in Europe:
 - Political: will US warheads be allowed to remain in Europe?
 - Procurement: dual-key arrangements based on aging fleets of allied DCA
- Reconsideration of “appropriate mix” of forces
 - Declining capabilities of conventional forces
 - Missile defense have no role in hybrid warfare
 - Logically, this implies an *increased* role for nuclear forces—but no interest by most allies



Michael Ammons, U.S. Air Force/Getty Images

Ballistic Missile Defenses

- European Phased Adaptive Approach
 - Agreed 2002
 - IOC announced at NATO Chicago Summit 2012
 - Obama cancelled Phase IV as part of “reset” with Moscow
 - Includes AEGIS at sea (Spain), land-based early warning (Turkey), and eventually AEGIS-Ashore (first deployed in Romania, 2015)
- Wales Summit emphasized BMD and its continued development
 - Part of appropriate mix of forces for Alliance
 - Russian actions in Eastern Europe since 2014 guaranteed deployment of all three phases



Arms Control

- Russia has abrogated, withdrawn, or no longer recognizes several Cold War treaties:
 - CFE—Russia stopped complying a decade ago
 - INF—US claims Russia has violated this with cruise missile testing
 - Helsinki Final Act—aggression against neighbor
 - Open Skies Treaty—selective implementation
- Moscow still officially abiding by strategic level New START Treaty
 - Bilateral relations continuing at strategic level
- But no movement toward new negotiations
 - Required by New START, US Senate ratification, DDP
 - Follow-on to New START should include discussions on non-strategic nuclear weapons



Alliance Enlargement

- Wales Summit emphasized continued growth of Alliance to include all eligible European states
- Candidate States:
 - Membership Action Plan
 - Montenegro
 - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*
 - Bosnia-Herzegovina
 - Intensified Dialogue with Annual National Programs
 - Ukraine
 - Georgia
- Wales Summit initiatives



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Warsaw Summit—July 2016

- Likely key topics for discussion:
 - New threats on Eastern and Southern Flanks
 - Russia
 - ISIL
 - NATO collective responses
 - Hybrid Warfare
 - Conventional initiatives
 - Nuclear deterrence
 - Partnerships
 - Relations with EU
 - Defense capacity building
 - Funding commitments
 - Alliance solidarity
 - Enlargement



Conclusion

- Wales Summit saw multiple initiatives and commitments in a communique approved by consensus of 28 member states
 - No desire to return to a cold war
 - No desire to appear provocative to Russia
 - But recognized need to:
 - Secure NATO's borders
 - Assure allies & partners
 - Enhance deterrence
- European security: concern, but not yet alarm
 - Arms control efforts have stalled
 - NATO and Russia are not speaking
 - Few allies willing to seriously think about what it means to be a nuclear Alliance
 - Nobody younger than colonel remembers the Cold War
 - Alliance must tread very carefully to avoid returning to that relationship—or creating rifts from the debate
 - But cold war still better than hybrid conflict

